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TICOM/I-119

FURTHER INTERROGATION OF R.R. VOEGELE
AND MAJOR FEICHTNER ON G.A.F. SIGINT

1. This further interrogation of R. R. VOEGELE and Major FEICHTNER was carried out by F/Lt. V. E. ROLF, Captain I. M. CAMPBELL, I.C., and Lt. LEVENSON, A.U.S. at the ROYAL VICTORIA PATRIOTIC SCHOOL, WANDSWORTH, S.W.18, on September 21st, 1945.
2. The previous report on these two prisoners was issued as TICOM/I-112. FEICHTNER's homework will be issued shortly as a separate report.
3. Since it will be impossible to retain VOEGELE and FEICHTNER in this country much beyond the end of September, it is requested that any questions arising out of these reports be telephoned or mailed to reach Ticom Duty Officer, Station X, telephone extension 163, before 30th September, 1945.

TICOM

25th September, 1945.

No. of pages. 6.

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I.

AMPLIFICATION OF CERTAIN ANSWERS IN REPORT
TICOM/I-112

1) Aircraft Reporting Code.Paragraph 4 (b) (i) (c) Hourly Broadcasts of barometric pressures.

From a list of possible stations, P.O.W. selected Mt. Batten, St. Eval, Chivenor and Predannack. He was a little doubtful about the last but remembered that its pronunciation caused difficulty over the telephone. He was certain of the first three, subject, of course, to possible evaluation errors.

2) Paragraph 4 (b) (ii) Aircraft Movements Code (UK)

This three letter code was first intercepted in the Autumn of 1944. Messages were characterised by a 3-figure serial number prefixed by H, HE, HA, HAA or HAAA. It was not recognised as an A/c Movements Code but was thought to deal with supplies. The letter prefixes to the serial No: were thought to have something to do with the area of operation. The traffic was worked on by a party with Hollerith assembly at BERLINCHEN, near KUSTRIN, which was captured by the Russians towards the end of January, 1945. They had three-figure versions of the traffic without preambles; the three-letter groups had previously been converted into 3-figure groups by VOEGELE to facilitate machining. Of the Hollerith team, only three escaped; the escapees included Uffz. MEICHSSNER, home address BAD GOTTLINBA, the pre-war Hollerith representative for Saxony. The code was not broken.

3) Paragraph 4 (c) RAF Syko (or REKOH).

The statement regarding the reading of syko messages by 3 or 4 p.m. referred to Home Syko in the early part of the war, i.e. before the introduction of Bomber Code and Aircraft Reporting Code. This syko was reciprocal and could be broken on about 20 messages. Valuable weather information was divulged.

Weather reports broadcast at 4 p.m. were available for operational use by 4.05 p.m.

Between the 21st and 23rd October, 1939, Honnington transmitted several times, both in Syko and RAF 4-figure, a message beginning: "The grass is so long and the work so slow..." The High Grade messages contained in clear in the preamble: "Repetition of Syko Message....."

Middle East and Ferry Syko (both renamed REKOH soon after they became non-reciprocal) could be read, but 40 to 50 messages were required to break the non-reciprocal cards. Owing to delays in collecting sufficient traffic there was a delay of 2 or 3 days in the breaking of Middle East Cards. This made the effort largely valueless to the evaluation section.

Ferry Syko (and Ferry REHOH) traffic was intercepted in Spain but was decyphered only once because the fortnight's time lag made the decodes useless for evaluation purposes. The time lag was partly due to the small volume of traffic and partly to the delay in receipt of the intercepts.

4) Paragraph 4(g). U.S. Hagelin Machine (I. 209)

In his reference to the breaking of I. 209 keys VOEGELE meant only one key on each of the days concerned. He was interested only in the Air Traffic. He could not remember the names of any units passing the traffic, but thought Oblt. BECKER of Referat B 2 (Evaluation) might be able to give this information.

The captured key chart remained in force for 26 to 27 days after its capture, i.e. till the end of the month. VOEGELE did not know where the chart was captured, but Oblt. MOOSHACKE in Evaluation Section of 24th KOMP RGT 351 (no longer a P.O.W.), a lawyer in BAD KISSINGEN, would know the units involved.

5) Strip Cypher (Para. 5 of "Points not covered by Questionnaire")

Northern route traffic with indicator URSAL was read from May or June, 1942, till the end.

Questioned about other indicators, VOEGELE gave XOGIB as a Southern Route indicator of traffic which could not be read.

He could not remember any other indicators but said he would recognise others if a list of those in use could be provided. He could not remember LEFOT.

The breaking of Strip traffic was subject to time lags of two months before the receipt of Hollerith machinery, but of only two to four weeks afterwards.

He repeated that no traffic was read after the introduction of strip elimination.

VOEGELE showed his method of attack on Strip to the Foreign Office and OKW, but he does not know what degree of success they had.

II. AMPLIFICATION OF VOEGELE'S HOMEWORK (attached to REPORT TICOM/I-112).

6) Transfer of Chistelle in Aug. 1939.

Transfer was from Berlin to Wildpark, Marstall, Potsdam.

7) RAF 4-figure Cypher - Para 4 (1)

In the early days of the war, work was facilitated by the heavy traffic. On one occasion they had 140 overlapping messages.

The duplication of messages in Syko and RAF 4-figure by Honnington, referred to under Syko, above, was very helpful.

/Later,

Later, in S.E. Europe, only Middle East traffic was worked on; the volume of intercepted traffic on the General table was negligible and easily segregated by means of the figure 4 at the end of the Indicator.

This is a copy
The original has
been retained under
section 3(4) of the
Public Records Act
1958.

- 8) Interdepartmental Cypher - Para 4 (n) (omitted from answers to homework previously set).

VOEGELE received a photostat copy of parent book in June 1940. (Told unofficially that it came from Bergen).

Traffic was exchanged with Navy and OKW so that all three received all the traffic which was a maximum of about 100 messages per month.

The traffic was mostly between the Near East, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland, Switzerland always being one table behind the others.

There were two tables with indicators CVCVC and VCVCV (which seemed the shorter), where C = consonant and V = vowel, and both were broken, their most successful period being 1940/41 when tables changed quarterly. In 1942, the interval was changed, he believed, to between 6 weeks and 2 months.

They stopped work on Interdepartmental Cypher in 1943 because the decodes were no longer of use to evaluation.

III. INFORMATION ON ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS.

- 9) Government Telegraph Code.

Between 28th August and September 1st, 1939, messages regarding the recalling of all ships were intercepted, and in late 1939 and early 1940 RAF casualty reports were often transmitted in G.T.C. Otherwise traffic in G.T.C. contained nothing of importance.

- 10) Bentley's Code.

This was used by BOAC, the bulk of the traffic intercepted being between South Africa and Egypt and ~~gypt~~ and ~~stati~~ n with callsign STL (Beirut?).

The five-letter code, with a private BOAC supplement of some five or six hundred five-letter groups beginning with Y, was used unrecoded. Most of these confidential groups were broken.

The five-figure code was employed recyphered for confidential administrative traffic. The breaking of this cypher was so simple that VOEGELE gave it to people under training.

Work ceased early in 1944 because the messages were no longer of interest to evaluation.

11) Indian Code "Q"

An Indian 4-letter code transmitted as 5-letter groups was intercepted and read until 1940 when they stopped taking this traffic. Two well-remembered groups were TAFM = begin spelling and ODUD = and.

12) Typex

VOEGELE stated that he would certainly have heard had Typex been broken, and reiterated most emphatically his belief that Typex was never broken. His considered opinion was that the breaking of Typex was impossible and, in consequence, he had never attempted the breaking of Typex in real earnest. He ceased taking the messages in 1940. When informed that a P.O.W. taken in Cyrenaica had described what appeared to be the registration of Typex traffic at Athens in 1942 or 43, VOEGELE said that one of his staff there, a cryptographer named ROSSKATH, had unofficially arranged that they take Typex traffic again for 4-6 weeks. This was after RAF 4-figure became impossible. Nothing came of it. ROSSKATH left the American Zone for the French Zone on May 7th or 8th, 1945, but failed to arrive.

VOEGELE thought the man taken in Cyrenaica must have been GERHARD who had been employed on Syko statistics.

13) Work on Turkish Air Force Cyphers.

This was carried on at Athens but all were so simple that VOEGELE'S assistance was not required. There were three systems:

- i) Periodic substitution (called by VOEGELE "Leaping Caesar"). This was changed monthly and broken in 2 hours.
- ii) Unrecoded alphabetical book.
- iii) Single Transposition - employed for weather.

14) Spanish Organisation

VOEGELE knew nothing of this but Feichtner was in Spain in 1938 during the civil war when his work was mostly R/T interception. FEICHTNER professed to have no knowledge of the organisation at that time as he was only an R/T intercept operator.

During the World War there were, at first, two units calling themselves Einkaufsstelle I and II, one at Madrid and one at Barcelona, but later these amalgamated and were located at Madrid.

Obinsp. TIBUSSEK and Obinsp. DR. EHME were in Spain with

/G.F

GAF Sigint units and could give up-to-date information on organisation. Oberlt. FISHBECK, Rgt. 351, Sigint Liaison Officer with Flifue Atlantik would know about information passed to Condors.

15) Liaison with Japanese

VOEGELE visited Berlin twice, once in January and again in February, 1942, for cryptographic discussions with Colonel HAYASHI but meetings did not materialize. VOEGELE believed meetings to have been prevented by Oberst KEMPF, chief of Chistelle in 1941 and 1942 (and possibly 1943).

16) Liaison with Finns.

VOEGELE had no contacts, but FRIEDRICH would know about liaison with Finns on Russian Cyphers.

17) Liaison with Hungarians.

VOEGELE had no contacts, but Lt. VON LINGEN and Oberlt. WERTHER were at DEBRECZEN before the war and up till 1940 or 41, working on Russian Cyphers.